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A Dagger Through the Heartland: The Louisville & Nashville Railroad in
the Civil War
Abstract

The Civil War was a defining moment in American history. What began as a sectional debate over states’ rights
transformed itself into a bloody odyssey that would alter the national character itself. Within the wide scope of
this conflict, scholars have sought to answer the multifaceted question of how the Union triumphed, often
citing the proficient management of the railways as a key contribution to victory. Within this logistical
network of rails, the Louisville & Nashville Railroad served as a vital mode of transportation for supplies and
troop mobility through the heartland states of Kentucky and Tennessee. The Union exploited this advantage,
thus making the Louisville & Nashville Railroad a case study in the field of Military History of successful:
defensive strategy, offensive strategy, tactical efficiency and establishment of secure logistical lines. Doing so
helped them secure the strategically important border state of Kentucky, which in turn became a launching
pad into Tennessee and ultimately, the Deep South itself. Hence, the Louisville & Nashville Railroad
significantly helped the Union win the Civil War.
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A DAGGER THROUGH THE HEARTLAND: THE
LOUISVILLE & NASHVILLE RAILROAD IN THE
CIVIL WAR
Gared N. Dalton
Historians have long debated whether the Civil War
was an old-fashioned or modern war, and with both sides
offering convincing evidence, it makes this historiographical
issue both arcane and, in some instances, irrelevant. But
when the issues include the use of railroads by the Union
military, one can only be left with the impression that if the
Civil War was not a modern one in all aspects, it certainly
was in the aspect of the North’s skillful implementation of
railways to overcome their strategic disadvantage of fighting
a war by means of exterior lines.1 One of the best examples
of the Union’s innovative use of an existing railroad was its
efficient and highly effective control of the Louisville and
Nashville (L&N) railroad in Kentucky and Tennessee for
most of the war.
The North’s control of the L&N reflected a profound
understanding by its military leaders for synchronizing
already existing railroads into a matrix for the transportation
of troops, supplies, wounded soldiers, and rapid deployment
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in response to the ever-changing battlespace.2 In
comparison, the South’s railway system was in utter
disarray, plagued with railways unlinked with others and
incompatible rail gauges, all of which created a logistical
nightmare.3 Within this logistical network of rails and
spikes, the Louisville and Nashville Railroad served as a
vital vein into the heartland of the Confederacy to be
exploited by the Union. Thus, it ensured a Northern victory
over its Southern aggressor by becoming a dagger that drove
straight into the Confederate heartland. This allowed the
Union to establish a reliable line of communication as well
as transport men and war materials directly toward the
heartland front, spanning from western Kentucky to eastern
Tennessee, and, later in the war, it played a key role in the
Chattanooga and Atlanta campaigns.4 Running between the
title cities of Louisville, Kentucky, and Nashville,
Tennessee, the L&N benefited the Union by providing a
logistical route in a geographic area that lacked navigable
rivers.5 Furthermore, the L&N was easily put into use by the
Union because they were the same gauge as the Northern
standard.6
2
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At the outbreak of the war, the L&N became a
contentious vital resource, eyed by both the Union and
Confederacy for its military potential. The Commonwealth
of Kentucky, however, decided to declare neutrality in the
war and remain in the Union. That neutrality ended when the
Confederate forces invaded the state, prompting the Union
command to send troops into the Northwestern portion of
Kentucky. In autumn of 1861, the Confederates established
a long and fragile battle line that extended from a left flank
of Columbus to a right flank near Mill Springs, supported by
a bastion in the center, Bowling Green, which they quickly
began to fortify in anticipation of a Union response.7 For a
short time, the L&N was partially in the hands of both sides.8
Breaking this line, the Union first attacked (and defeated) the
Confederates at Mill Springs in January of 1862, obliterating
their right flank. Then, a month later, General Grant
eradicated the Confederate left flank by attacking Corinth
and subsequently securing Forts Henry and Donelson in
Northwestern Tennessee.9 With the successful attacks on the
Confederate flanks, the Union forces then positioned
themselves to secure the bastion of the Confederate line,
Bowling Green.
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Continuing the Union momentum, General Buell
implemented the L&N to maneuver his troops toward
Bowling Green in hopes of breaking the crumbling
Confederate grip upon Kentucky.10 Recognizing the
inevitable, Confederate General Johnston retreated from
Bowling Green and took up a new position at a rail hub in
Corinth, Tennessee. With General Buell subsequently
occupying Bowling Green, Kentucky and Gallatin,
Tennessee, the Confederate hold on Kentucky was lost.
When Nashville fell to Union forces on February 25th, every
mile of the L&N belonged to the Union military, which
meant the North now held a major transportation and
industrial center they could use to strike deeper into the
Confederacy.11
While occupying Nashville, the army under the
command of General Buell also became “wholly dependent”
upon the L&N for supplies.12 Every bullet, black powder
canister, food ration and medicinal instrument for the entire
Army of the Ohio could now be expediently transported on
the L&N. Even the letters from soldiers, the only connection
that could soften the hard life as a soldier, could ride from
Nashville to Louisville and find their way to their Northern
recipient.13 Because of the Union victories in Kentucky and
10

Turner, Victory Rode the Rails, 116.
Ibid., 125.
12
General Buell, December 18, 1862 in the U.S. War Department, The
War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union
and Confederate Armies, series 1 vol. 16, 158. Hereafter cited as O.R.
All references are to Series 1.
13
Gerald Linderman, Embattled Courage: The Experience of Combat in
the American Civil War (New York: Free Press, 1987), 94.
11

87

Dalton
Tennessee, the L&N was a reliable logistical source for their
forces. However, as General Buell would discover, there
were risks involved when relying upon one logistical
resource.
The Confederacy, however, decided it had
surrendered too much ground and chose to counter the Union
advances by launching their Heartland Offensive in mid1862. Doing so would demonstrate how vital the L&N truly
was for Union as it had become the sturdy backbone that
helped halt the Confederate campaign. As the Union was
securing its grip upon the L&N railway,
Confederate forces employed Colonel John Hunt Morgan
and his raiders to sabotage the Union’s vital supply line. One
of the earliest attacks upon the L&N occurred in May of
1862, when Morgan’s raiders attempted to free Confederate
prisoners of war aboard a northbound train near Cave City,
Kentucky. Not being able to obtain their goal, the raiders
sufficed their expedition by capturing a passenger train and
successfully burning forty-five freight cars and blowing up
the locomotive.14
Tirelessly, the Confederacy persisted in its attempts
to wreak havoc along the L&N, hoping for enough success
to render the railroad virtually unusable as a secure resource,
but Union authorities were determined to keep trains running
along the L&N. In a report to President Lincoln alerting him
of Morgan’s entrance into Kentucky, Tennessee’s Military
Governor Andrew Johnson concluded that the Louisville14

Report of H.W. Stager, telegraph operator, May 11, 1862 in O.R.
10:891.
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Nashville railway was the main target of these raids and
“should be protected by all means.”15 For the remainder of
1862, the L&N would serve as both a vital asset to the Union
to counter the Confederate Offensive and as a strategic target
for the Confederacy.
But this was no simple task for Union generals.
Between July 1861 and June 1862, damages caused by
Confederate raids resulted in a total of sixteen locomotives
lost or damaged, 142 box cars destroyed, and a multitude of
flatbeds, coal cars, and passenger cars put out of
commission.16 In 1862, Morgan continued to plague the
L&N with attacks along the line. His successful raids served
as a template for future raids, but were most effective in this
time frame due to the less than adequate defenses of the
railroad. In August of 1862, he attacked Gallatin, Tennessee
and disrupted communications between Louisville and
Nashville by destroying a bridge and a locomotive attached
to numerous cars.17 His raiders also made rail tunnels around
Gallatin nearly impassible, hoping to cripple Buell’s supply
line for weeks, if not months.18 Doing so would, they hoped,
stall the Union advance through Tennessee and force the
Union army to address their supply lines. A few days later,
after Union troops repaired the railway, Morgan’s men then
cut the telegraph wires, alienating General Buell’s army in
15
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Nashville with no means of communicating with other
Union armies in the field or with the War Department in
Washington.19
The continual assaults upon the railway showed
Morgan’s ingenious tactical technique: by implementing his
cavalry in swift raids and striking at various locations
without warning, he baffled the Union commanders, leaving
them to question how they could defend their strategic
railroad. Capture was merely an appealing, yet allusive, idea,
and the cavalry that would be required to adequately chase
and destroy Morgan’s’ force was unavailable. To deter
attacks, General Buell scattered small detachments of troops
along the railroad.20 Enough to deter Morgan from striking
defended locations, his forces focused instead on weakly
held, or undefended, sections of the railroad. But the Union,
heavily reliant upon the L&N, would be forced to repair
whatever damages Morgan’s forces inflicted. In September
1862, when Confederate General Bragg launched an
invasion into Kentucky—coordinated to coincide with
General Lee’s invasion into Maryland—Morgan again
destroyed sections of the railroad to hinder Buell’s approach
to counter Bragg.21
Meanwhile, the Confederate Heartland Offensive
was straining the Union’s defensive lines. Needing to
counter the offensive, or to simply halt its advance, the
Union authorities in Kentucky stationed troops along the
19
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entirety of the L&N, forming a battle-line to oppose the
Confederates. Doing so was tactically sound because not
only did the L&N need to be defended, but it could then be
used to aid any Union advance from anywhere its tracks laid.
The Union could have easily maneuvered soldiers from any
area along the rail to either counter the Confederate
offensive or launch a counter attack.
Fearing a decisive attack, Major-General Halleck,
General-in-Chief of the Union armies, sent reinforcements
from Indiana and Illinois to the battle-line through
Louisville, using the L&N to hasten their journey.22
Analyzing the Union’s defenses of the L&N, prior to the
reinforcements, Captain C.C. Gilbert reported his
unfavorable opinion to General Buell. In his estimation, the
detachments of ten or twelve men were too scarce and too
small, and the entirety of defenses inadequate due to the less
than satisfactory earthworks. Lastly, he noted that no
defenses existed between Munfordville and Louisville at that
time.23 He rightly shared his worries because one intent of
the Heartland Campaign was an all-out assault by
Confederate forces aimed to repulse the Union forces and
secure portions of the L&N.
In September 1862, Confederate General George
Williamson, acting under General Polk, ordered an attack on
Proctor’s Station and Cave City, Kentucky in order to secure
and hold those stations.24 If successful, the attack would cut
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the Union hold on the L&N and would leave all of the
Federal forces south of Cave City alienated from their main
supply and communication lines, not to mention vulnerable
to being surrounded. The choice of location was a sound
tactical move because the stretch of rail from Lebanon
Junction to Bowling Green made a salient bowed to the
south, with Cave City at the peak, thus making it more
susceptible to attack. To support this assault, Confederate
Colonel John Pegram ordered cavalry under the command of
Colonel John Scott to destroy the L&N to halt Buell’s
approach.25 Despite their best efforts to hinder either the
Union’s use of the L&N or their strategic hold on Kentucky,
the Confederate forces did not succeed in either endeavor.
Following the battle of Perryville on October 8th, the
Confederate leadership decided to cut their losses of their
flailing invasion and subsequently retreated. Both the Union
and the L&N earned credit for holding the strategic border
state of Kentucky. Without the L&N’s backbone support of
the Union lines, the North’s ability to defend Kentucky
would have been greatly reduced, possibly even rendering
them incapable of doing so. Thus, the L&N was a vital part
of the Union’s repulsion of the Confederate Heartland
Campaign.
In November of 1862, with the Union having secured
and repaired the entirety of the L&N’s railway, the blue-clad
soldiers of the North stood poised to thrust a dagger into the

25
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Confederate heartland.26 But the South, eager to thwart any
Union advance southward, launched a surprise attack upon
the L&N by dispatching Morgan to attack the trestles at
Muldraugh’s Hill, Kentucky.27 He successfully reached his
target on December 28, 1862, by leveraging his cavalry’s
speed and agility to move northward all while delaying
Union forces with flank skirmishes. After pummeling the
garrison with artillery and forcing the Union troops to
surrender, his raiders burned the two trestle bridges of the
L&N. Immediately after achieving his goal, Morgan’s force
retreated, in order to avoid entrapment, to Confederate lines
in Tennessee on January 2nd, 1863.28 Just like before, the
Federal troops called upon their engineer corps to make
rapid repairs to the railway to mitigate the damage dealt to
the L&N, so it could continue to be implemented as a vital
logistical tool as they advance southward.
Thus, when 1863 dawned, Union leaders were
preparing a dual offensive to capture Chattanooga and
Knoxville, hoping to secure Tennessee and push the Union
battle lines deeper into the Confederate heartland, to a point
where they were virtually knocking on the door of the Deep
South.29 Still hoping to cripple or stall the Union advance,
the South was preparing their updated raiding strategy for
the upcoming year. But the Union had learned from the raids
of 1862 and improved their defenses, including the L&N, by
26
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upgrading the blockhouse system already in place with
embanked walls around the blockhouses and by positioning
artillery near the railroad.30 It appeared that the worries in
Captain Gilbert’s unfavorable report were no longer a
concern.
With the L&N secured, but still under threat of
Confederate raids, the Union pushed deeper into Southern
territory. The L&N continued to provide vital service to the
Union armies in the Western Theatre as a major supply line
but also now to the troops of General Rosecrans.31 However,
beyond serving as a vital vein for supplies and
communication, the L&N by autumn of 1862 was routinely
used to transport injured soldiers to rear-ward medical
facilities in Louisville and Nashville.32 The railroad
facilitated the transport of thousands of soldiers to larger
facilities that were better equipped to serve their needs,
improving the chance of survival. If anything, it could have
been a needed morale boost to the wounded soldier to
disengage from the conflict and be in more constant contact
with friends and family. This system impressed General
Thomas so much that he actually required the hospital trains
to be equipped with the best crews and locomotive engines
available.33
In late 1863, the L&N was still a vital tool, as it aided
the Union in ousting the Confederates from Kentucky. Later
that year, the L&N best displayed its efficiency with the
30
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dramatic movement of General Hooker’s Eleventh and
Twelfth Corps to aid in the capture of Chattanooga, TN.
With Rosecrans’s defeat at Chickamauga, Assistant
Secretary of War Charles Dana requested over twenty
thousand troops to be hurried to Eastern Tennessee to not
only assist Rosecrans, whose army was under siege in
Chattanooga, but also to set the stage for upcoming
operations into Georgia.34 In response, Secretary of War
Stanton boasted that 30,000 Union troops from the Army of
the Potomac in the east could be taxied via rail to
Chattanooga in five days. The planned route would ship the
soldiers from Washington, D.C on the B&O railroad to
Baltimore, where they would pick up the main B&O track to
the Ohio River and be ferried across. Once across the river,
they subsequently marched from Columbus to Indianapolis
and then southward to cross the Ohio River into Louisville,
KY. Once in Louisville, they then would ride the L&N to
Nashville and be loaded unto the Nashville-Chattanooga
railway to complete their journey.35 After departing on
September 26th, and following some delays in Indianapolis,
the two corps arrived in Chattanooga fourteen days later.36
To appreciate the sheer scale of maneuverability the L&N
contributed to this scheme, one need only to consider the fact
that the railroad moved 25,000 troops, accompanied by ten
artillery batteries and one hundred cars of baggage a distance
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35
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of approximately 1,200 miles in two weeks.37 This logistical
feat truly demonstrated not only the Union’s mastery of the
rail system, but also how interconnected it was, allowing
specific lines like the L&N to become important resources
in strategic planning and implementation. Thus, Rosecrans
was reinforced and the Union lines held in Tennessee,
despite the dire siege that poised to become a Confederate
victory.
However, the Confederacy had not forgotten the
importance of the L&N to the Union cause. Once more, they
sent Morgan, the proven cavalry raider, with orders to attack
the three hundred-man garrison holding Louisville.38 This
summer raid was designed to serve not only as a disruption
of Union supply lines and a distraction for Union cavalry but
also as a recruitment devise aimed at encouraging
sympathetic Kentuckians to join the Confederate cause.39
But Morgan, disregarding his orders, set his focus on an
assault in Indiana and Ohio rather than attacking the garrison
in Louisville.40 Morgan and his raiders attacked the L&N at
Lebanon Junction, which Morgan’s raiders captured before
promptly departing across the Ohio River to continue their
raid northward. But this time, success eluded Morgan and
his raiders. After being defeated on July 19, the raiders were
now fleeing Union territory. Morgan’s “Great Raid,” as it
came to be called, concluded when his force was
unsurprisingly surrounded by Union forces in Ohio,
37
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surrendering, thus closing his chapter of terror upon the
railway.41
The mastery of railways by the Union military during
the American Civil War truly contributed to their victory
over the Confederacy. Within this network of Unioncontrolled railways, the Louisville & Nashville played a
significant role in aiding the Federal armies’ invasion into
the Deep South while still keeping a reliable flow of men and
supplies to wherever the North needed them. Without the
L&N, Union armies of the Western Theatre would have
fought a treacherous campaign without sufficient supplies or
means of adequate transportation for their wounded. In these
respects, the L&N became a dagger in the hands of the
Federal armies who benefited from the railroad’s
geographical location, efficient and reliable transportation,
and long reach from Louisville to the vital river and rail hub
of Nashville. By any measure, the L&N stands as an example
of how the Union military fought a modern war in which
steel rails meant the difference between victory and defeat.
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